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LABOR LAW- EQUAL PAY ACT -
ECONOMIC BENEFIT To EMPLOYER IS JUSTIFICATION FOR
WAGE DIFFERENTIAL BETWEEN MALE AND FEMALE EMPLOYEES
The Secretary of Labor sought an injunction' against Robert Hall
Clothes, Inc.2 alleging that the store had violated the Equal Pay Act
3
by paying the salesmen who worked exclusively in the men's de-
partment a higher rate of pay than the saleswomen who worked ex-
clusively in the women's department even though the work performed
was substantially equal. Since the men's department was more profit-
able,4 Robert Hall contended that it was justified in paying the sales-
men more; therefore, the wage differential between salesmen and sales-
women was based on a factor other than sex which constituted an excep-
tion, section 206 (d) (1) (iv), to the Equal Pay Act. The Secretary of
Labor contended that economic benefit to the employer is not an ac-
ceptable justification for a wage differential under section 206 (d) (1) (iv)
because it is not related to job performance or typically used in setting
wage scales. The District Court of Delaware held that the wage differen-
tial between the part-time salesmen and saleswomen was not justified,
but that the store was justified in paying the full-time saleswomen
less than the full-time salesmen because of economic benefits to the
employer.' On appeal to the Third Circuit Court of Appeals,
'Using the enforcement provisions of the Equal Pay Act, the Secretary was
seeking an injunction against future violations and the withholding of back pay.
See 29 C.F.R. §§ 800.164-.166 (1972).
2Robert Hall Clothes, Inc., named as a defendant, is a Delaware corporation
with its main office in New York. The corporation has several wholly owned sub-
sidiaries. One of these, Robert Hall Clothes of Jamaica, Inc., owns Robert Hall
Clothes Greenbank Corp., the other defendant and the subject of this litigation.
Hodgson v. Robert Hall Clothes, Inc., 326 F. Supp. 1264, 1267-68 (D. Del. 1971).
$The Equal Pay Act of 1963, an amendment to the Fair Labor Standards Act
of 1938, provides:
No employer having employees subject to any provisions of this section shall
discriminate, within any establishment in which such employees are em-
ployed, between employees on the basis of sex by paying wages to employees
in such establishment at a rate less than the rate at which he pays wages
to employees of the opposite sex in such establishment for equal work on
jobs the performance of which requires equal skill, effort, and responsibility,
and which are performed under similar working conditions, except where
such payment is made pursuant to (i) a seniority system; (ii) a merit
system; (iii) a system which measures earnings by quantity or quality of
production; or (iv) a differential based on any other factor other than sex:
Provided, That an employer who is paying a wage rate differential in viola-
tion of this subsection shall not, in order to comply with the provisions of
this subsection, reduce the wage rate of any employee.
29 U.S.C. § 206 (d) (1) (1970).
4The men's department carried more expensive merchandise which resulted in
a gross profit of $148,001.30 in 1969 as compared to a gross profit in the women's
department of $92,686.87. The records produced were for 1963 through 1969 and
showed similar discrepandes between the departments for each year. Hodgson v.
Robert Hall Clothes, Inc., 326 F. Supp. 1264, 1276 (D. Del. 1971).
5The district court based its decision on the premise that the relevant figures
were those relating economic benefit to the employer by the individual salesperson.
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held, affirmed as to the full-time personnel and reversed as to the
part-time personnel. Where there is a valid business reason for an
occupation qualification based on sex, a wage differential based on
economic benefit to the employer is recognized as a factor other than
sex and, therefore, not a violation of the Equal Pay Act. Hodgson v.
Robert Hall Clothes, Inc., 473 F.2d 589 (3d Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 42
U.S.L.W. 3186 (U.S. Oct., 9, 1973) (No. 72-1615).
At the beginning of the 20th century, women represented 18 per-
cent of the American labor force. By 1966 this figure had doubled. In-
stead of promoting equality between the sexes, the rising employment
rate of women often had the opposite effect. Women were relegated to
certain jobs and paid less than men performing similar work.6 A few
states passed laws requiring equal pay for males and females performing
the same work, but Federal legislation was not passed until the Equal
Pay Act of 1963. 7 The purpose of the Equal Pay Act s was to give women
equal rights in the economic area and eliminate sex-based wage discrim-
ination, with its corresponding stigma of inferiority. The Act also sought
to alleviate the depressing effects which reduced wages for women have
on living standards.9 For the first 6 years the Act encountered resistance
in the courts,' ° and informal compliance was scattered and reluctant."
When the courts were called upon to interpret the Act's provisions, the
Ordinarily Robert Hall did not keep such records. The only individual records
available represented two 10-week periods out of the 6 years involved in the suit.
Id. at 1278.
6Kanowitz, Sex-Based Discrimination in American Law III: Title VII of the
1964 Civil Rights Act and the Equal Pay Act of 1963, 20 HASTINGs L.J. 305, 305-08
(1968).
The median income of women fluctuated between 63.9 percent and 58 percent
of men's income between 1955 and 1968. Murphy, Female Wage Discrimination: A
Study of the Equal Pay Act 1963-1970, 39 U. CIN. L. Rav. 615, 616-17 (1970).
729 U.S.C. § 206(d) (1) (1970). The Equal Pay Act was passed as an amendment
to the Fair Labor Standards Act of 1938, Pub. L. No. 718 (June 25, 1938). For the
guidelines on coverage of the Fair Labor Standards Act and the Equal Pay Act see
29 C.F.R. §§ 800.0, .5 to .12 (1972).
SSee 109 CONG. REc. 8702 (daily ed. May 23, 1963). For some of the legislative
history of the Equal Pay Act see 109 CONG. REc. 8683-8707 (daily ed. May 23, 1963).
OShultz v. Wheaton Glass Co., 421 F. 2d 259, 265 (3d Cir. 1970), cert. denied,
398 U.S. 905 (1970). The Civil Rights Act of 1964 also prohibited discrimination
based on sex in employment practices. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000 e-2 (1970).
lOAs one commentator has noted:
A review of the early Equal Pay Act cases in the district courts conveys
• . . an unwillingness on the part of federal judges to separate their own
manhood and their lifelong impressions of the role of women in society
from their duty as judges to interpret the law as written.
Sangerman, A Look at the Equal Pay Act in Practice, 22 LAB. L.J. 259 (1971). See
Wirtz v. Muskogee Jones Store Co., 293 F. Supp. 1034 (E.D. Okla. 1968); Wirtz v.
American Can Co.-Dixie Products, 288 F. Supp. 14 (W.D. Ark. 1968), rev'd sub
nom. Shultz v. American Can Co.-Dixie Products, 424 F.2d 356 (8th Cir. 1970).
"iMurphy, supra note 6. at 616.
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term "equal" job12 presented the most problems.13 Unequal work was
the most frequently cited excuse for wage differentials. In Wirtz v.
Wheaton Glass Co.,' 4 the District Court of New Jersey interpreted equal
to mean "substantially identical" with reference to compared jobs.'
5
Since jobs are seldom identical, the Wheaton interpretation was a major
stumbling block for effective enforcement of the Act.' 6 The major
breakthrough came with a forcefully written opinion reversing Wheaton
in which the Third Circuit Court of Appeals declared that men and
women who do "substantially equal" work should be paid equally, and
that "[a]ny other interpretation would destroy the remedial purposes of
the Act. '"17 The Act is now being vigorously enforced by the Labor De-
partment.' s If the work done by males and females is found to be equal
and the pay unequal, the employer must bring himself within one of
the four exceptions to avoid violating the Act.' 9 The most litigated ex-
ception is section 206 (d) (1) (iv), the broad exception which permits
wage differentials "based on any other factor other than sex." 20 Since
12Four criteria are used to determine whether compared jobs are equal: (1)
Equal skill "includes consideration of such factors as experience, training, education,
and ability" measured in terms of job requirements. 29 C.F.R. § 800.125 (1972). See,
e.g., Shultz v. Kimberly-Clark Corp., 315 F. Supp. 1323, 1332 (W.D. Tenn. 1970).
(2) Equal "[e]ffort is concerned with the measurement of the physical or mental
exertion needed for the performance of a job." 29 C.F.R. § 800.127 (1972). See, e.g.,
Hodgson v. Daisy Mfg. Co., 317 F. Supp. 538 (W.D. Ark. 1970). (3) Equal re-
sponsibility concerns "the degree of accountability required in the performance of the
job, with emphasis on importance of the job obligation." 29 C.F.R. § 800.129 (1972).
See, e.g., Hodgson v. Daisy Mfg. Co., 317 F. Supp. 538 (W.D. Ark. 1970). (4) Similar
working conditions is determined by a "practical judgment . . . in light of whether
the differences in working conditions are the kind customarily taken into considera-
tion in setting wage levels." 29 C.F.R. § 800.131(1972). See, e.g., Wirtz v. Basic Inc.,
256 F. Supp. 786, 790-91 (D. Nev. 1966).
:LMurphy, supra note 6, at 623.
14284 F. Supp. 23 (D.N.J. 1968), rev'd sub nom. Shultz v. Wheaton Glass Co.,
421 F.2d 259 (3d Cir. 1970).
'5Id. at 32.
16Wirtz v. Rainbow Baking Co., 303 F. Supp. 1049, 1052 (E.D. Ky. 1967).
i7Shultz v. Wheaton Glass Co., 421 F.2d 259, 265 (3d Cir. 1970), cert. denied,
398 U.S. 905 (1970) (The Secretary of Labor proved that male selector-packers were
being paid 10 percent more than female selector-packers for performing the same
work. Occasional additional work performance by the male selector-packers was also
done by snap-up boys paid about the same as female selector-packers and therefore
the 10 percent wage differential was not justified).
isSangerman, supra note 10, at 265.
1929 U.S.C. §§ 206 (d) (1) (i) - (iv) (1970). There are three specific exceptions to
the Equal Pay Act: (1) a seniority system. See, e.g., Kilpatrick v. Sweet, 262 F. Supp.
561, 564 (M.D. Fla. 1967). (2) a merit system. See 29 C.F.R. §§ 800.140, .144 (1972);
Hodgson v. The Washington Hospital, 65 CCH LAB. L. REv. 32,499 (W.D. Pa.
1971). (3) a system for measuring earnings by quantity or quality of work. See 29
C.F.R. §§ 800.140, .144 (1972).
20This broad exception was included because it was impossible to list every
exception. 109 CONG. RE c. 8699 (daily ed. May 23, 1963).
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section 206 (d) (1) (iv) could be abused by the employers, the courts
have been closely examining the circumstances surrounding wage dif-
ferentials when this clause is raised as a defense.2 1 In order to prevent
such abuses the courts look at the actual performance and requirements
of the job.22 In Shultz v. Wheaton Glass Co., 23 a showing that the flexi-
bility of male employees was of some unmeasured advantage to the em-
ployer was not a factor other than sex and did not justify a 10 percent
wage differential over female employees performing substantially equal
work. In another recent decision the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals
found that a vague training program for males was largely illusory and
only an excuse to pay males more than females doing equal work.24
Similarly, an Arkansas district court found a job classification system
of "heavy" work for males and "light" work for females to be arbitrary
and to serve no purpose but to hide a prohibited wage differential.
2
Another court discovered that higher wages paid to workers on a night
shift had never been regarded as compensation for night work but had
been established because men refused to work the day shift for the low
pay rate of women.
26
In the instant case the court reasoned that since the statute pro-
vided that exceptions to the Equal Pay Act applied to males and females
performing equal work, Congress intended to allow justifiable wage
differentials between such employees. Further, the court found that the
basis of the wage differential may be a factor not related to job perform-
ance as evidenced by the exceptions regarding wage differentials based
on seniority, section 206 (d) (1) (i), and "any other factor other than
sex," section 206 (a) (1) (iv) . Neither of these are necessarily related to
job performance.27 The court cited section 206 (d) (1) (iv) and stated
that the economic benefit to the employer was a legitimate business rea-
son and a factor other than sex, thus allowing the employer to pay
salesmen more than saleswomen performing equal work. The court also
noted that segregation of the salespeople was justified by a valid business
2ZThe Labor Department lost most of its early Equal Pay Act cases. A major
contributing factor to these losses was misapplication of section 206 (d) (1) (iv). Mur-
phy, supra note 10, at 623. See, e.g., Wirtz v. American Can Co.-Dixie Products, 288 F.
Supp. 14 (W.D. Ark. 1968), rev'd sub nom. Shultz v. American Can Co.-Dixie
Products, 424 F.2d 356 (8th Cir. 1970).
22See 29 C.F.R. § 800.121 (1972).
23421 F.2d 259 (3d Cir. 1970), cert. denied, 398 U.S. 905 (1970).
24Shultz v. First Victoria Bank, 420 F.2d 648 (5th Cir. 1969).
25Hodgson v. Daisy Mfg. Co., 317 F. Supp. 538 (W.D. Ark. 1970).
26Hodgson v. Coming Glass Works, 474 F.2d 226 (2d Cir. 1973).
The following are not allowed as bases for wage differentials for otherwise
equal jobs because they are based on sex: that the employee is head of a household,
29 C.F.R. § 800.149 (1972); that women cost more to employ, 29 C.F.R. § 800.151
(1972); that legal restrictions in state or other laws limit the number of hours,
weight-lifting, and rest periods for women, 29 C.F.R. § 800.163 (1972).
27The court quickly dismissed the Secretary's other contention that the factor
other than sex must be "one typically used in setting wage scales" by saying that
economic benefit was probably used by employers in setting wage scales. The Secre-
tary had not included this test until his reply brief in this appeal.
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reason, therefore not contravening Title VII of the Civil Rights Act.28
The court concluded that it was unnecessary for the employer to justify
his base salary by correlating it to individual performance.29 Since the
men's department was more profitable than the women's department,
the court reasoned that the wage differential was justified and therefore
a "clear pattern of discrimination" 0 did not exist.
The decision in the instant case could have a detrimental effect on
the efficacy of the Equal Pay Act. The court was faced with striking a
balance between freedom for the employer to set his own pay standards
and the need to end discrimination based on sex. The former policy ap-
parently prevailed. Economic benefit to the employer may be proper
justification for wage differentials. However, since it is well-known that
women, in general, will do the same work for less pay than men, it is
possible that economic benefit to the employer was not Robert Hall's true
motive for paying saleswomen less than salesmen.3s Although the store is
departmentalized, it is still a unit,32 and it can be argued that the success
28SSince physical contact was necessary, the jobs were segregated on the basis of
sex to avoid embarrassment to the customers which would inhibit sales. See 42 U.S.C.
§ 2000e-2(h) (1970). Wage classification systems which designate certain jobs as
"female" jobs and others as "male" jobs may contravene Title VII of the Civil Rights
Act of 1964 except in certain instances where sex is a bona fide occupational qualifi-
cation necessary to normal operation of a business. 29 C.F.R. § 800.114(1972). For
guidelines for harmonizing the Civil Rights Act with the Equal Pay Act see 29 C.F.R.
§ 1604.7 (1972).
29The district court had used individual performances as the basis of its de-
cision; see note 5 supra.
80109 CONG. REc. 8697 (daily ed. May 23, 1963) (remarks of Representative
Goodell).
The dissent in the instant case insisted that the court was bound by the find-
ings of fact of the lower court. The Secretary had made out a prima facie case
against Robert Hall by showing discrimination on an individual basis with regard
to the part-time saleswomen. The dissent reasoned that the burden was on Robert
Hall to prove that the wage differential was based on a factor other than sex, and
that this burden was not satisfied by general assertions of economic benefits.
slSaleswomen make 40.5 percent of the income of salesmen. See Hodgson v. City
Stores, Inc., 332 F. Supp. 942 (M.D. Ala. 1971), aff'd sub nom. Brennen v. City
Stores, Inc., 21 Wage & Hour Cas. 69 (5th Cir. 1973). This department store had
violated the Equal Pay Act by hiring saleswomen for less pay than salesmen per-
forming equal work. Some of the justifications given by the defendant were that
the wage differentials "resulted from traditional and historical differences in job
content," and "the scale prevalent in the labor market." The court replied:
The fact that women tend to receive less from the labor market as a whole
. ..carries no weight since defendant may not justify its discrimination by
pointing to the conduct of others. The fact that the defendant has suc-
ceeded in paying a low, labor market rate does not authorize that which
the Act seeks to end: wage differentials within its store between equivalent
jobs.
Id. at 949-50. See Hodgson v. Coming Glass Works, 474 F.2d 226, 233-35 (2d Cir.
1973); Shultz v. Brookhaven General Hospital, 436 F2d 719, 726 (5th Cir. 1970).
32See 29 C.F.R. § 779.304 (1972).
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of one department depends to some extent on the other.83 Therefore, the
true value of one department may be incapable of valid measurement,
and salespersons performing equal work in each department should be
paid according to the income of the store as a unit. If the employer is
allowed to use economic benefit as a justification for pay differentials,
the correlation should be strictly on an individual basis and substantiated
by individual records. A flat salary based on each department's profit
assumes that each salesman is making more profit for the store than each
saleswoman. A useful analogy can be found in the claim that wage
differentials are justified because women cost more to employ than men.
This has been held to be a violation of the Equal Pay Act because it
groups employees on the basis of sex, and thus assumes that the factor
of sex alone justifies the pay differential. By grouping employees on the
basis of sex the group cost is assessed against the individual of one sex
without considering whether that person actually costs more to employ
than a specific person of the opposite sex. 34 Further, in order to meet
the requirements for the exception of any factor other than sex, sex
can provide no part of the basis for the wage differential. 35 In the instant
case, it cannot be said that these requirements were met since the em-
ployees were grouped on the basis of their sex. In Robert Hall the court
refused to follow the lead of the cases immediately preceding it which
delved into the justifications for wage differentials to discover evidence
of discrimination. If the Equal Pay Act is to be effective, the courts must
discover the motive for paying women less, not just accept the employer's
excuse at face value. Robert Hall may represent a step backward for the
Equal Pay Act and the ramifications of the decision should be carefully
studied before it is allowed to stand. This decision could be broadly
construed to enable an employer to undermine the Act by justifying his
wage differentials with a general assertion that male employees are of
more economic benefit. If economic benefit is allowed as an exception
to the Act, it should be strictly correlated to individual employees, and
the courts must be alert for patterns of discrimination against one sex.
Otherwise, economic benefit to the employer, as an exception to the
Equal Pay Act, could be the loophole through which the whole purpose
of the Act could disappear.
Judith Jones Johnson
SSFor example, women often buy their husband's clothes while shopping for
their own, and families often shop together; therefore, many people would find a
department store more convenient.
3429 C.F.R. § 800.151 (1972).
3529 C.F.R. § 800.142 (1972).
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